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Cooperative enterprise has appeal as a means of filling gaps in the economic 
institutions of the rural sectors of the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. But in addition to problems 
that have faced cooperatives in the West because of their inherent 
characteristics, the Soviet-era legacy created cultural burdens that 
cooperatives will have to overcome. A review of countries’ experiences 
since 1989 indicates some commonalities in attempts to create “new 
cooperatives,” but also instructive differences across countries. The evidence 
so far is unfavorable for cooperatives in agricultural production. In 
marketing and input supply the current situation is more promising. In both 
production and marketing, the economic institutions remain in flux. Unique 
approaches involving cooperatives may take permanent root, but their long-
term prospects are in doubt. 
 
The collapse of the command economy of the Soviet Union and countries within its 
sphere of influence in 1989-91 provided the opportunity for many economic 
adventures. One of these was the opportunity for new roles for cooperatives. The 
collapse created an institutional vacuum surrounding large “farm enterprises”– the 
dominant organizational form in former socialist agriculture – in which basic 
economic functions were not being performed. While the idea of rural cooperation 
has had a mixed history in the world’s market economies, conditions in the former 
Soviet Union and other formerly collectivized farm sectors in Central and Eastern 
Europe appear in important respects promising for the cooperative form of 
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business. So far, however, cooperative enterprise has not taken off as a means of 
economic organization. This paper considers the record and the reasons for it. 
 
 
Economic Environment of the Early 1990s 
 
In general the agricultural sectors of the formerly centrally planned economies 
were in a state of disarray and economic crisis in the period after the socialist 
governments fell.  The former command system disappeared almost overnight 
while new market structures had not yet emerged, and state support provided to the 
large farm enterprises was largely withdrawn. An immediate outcome of this 
transition shock was a sharp decline in both agricultural output and the sector’s 
GDP (value added) in the early 1990s. However, the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) recovered from this initial decline much faster than the 
former Soviet republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Gross 
agricultural product in the CEE countries stabilized after 1994, while the decline in 
CIS agriculture continued for four more years, until 1998 (Table 1, Figure 1). The 
principal reason for the difference appears to be the more resolute adherence of 
CEE governments to reform policies throughout their economies. Agricultural 
labor in CEE countries as a group declined all through the 1990s, as growing 
economies provided alternative employment opportunities to some in the relatively 
large rural population (Table 1, Figure 2). In CIS, on the other hand, the shrinking 
economy triggered a substantial increase in agricultural labor during that period, in 
a sharp contrast to the pre-1990 pattern, when Soviet labor was shifting from 
agriculture to other sectors of the economy. The differences in the behavior of 
agricultural output and labor between CEE and CIS produced sharp differences in 
productivity of agricultural labor: it generally increased in the CEE countries, 
while declining through 1998 in CIS (Table 1, Figure 3). Although total factor 
productivity or technical efficiency changes are more difficult to estimate because 
of severe data limitations, some attempts have been made and the findings are 
similar to those for labor productivity. Kim et al., 2005, undertook technical 
efficiency growth comparisons for 22 CEE and CIS countries over the 1992-2001 
period. They found higher rates of increase in the CEE countries, and moreover 
variations in efficiency gains across countries in the CEE group were positively 
associated with measures of economic reform. Agricultural Cooperative Enterprise  3
Table 1. Agricultural output, agricultural labor, and agricultural labor 
productivity for CEE and CIS, 1990-2002 (percent of 1990) 
 
  Ag output  Ag output  Ag labor 
productivity 
Year CIS CEE CIS  CEE  CIS  CEE 
1990 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1991 89  95 107 94  84 101 
1992 85  82 113 90  76 94 
1993 83  79 112 85  76 99 
1994 73  76  110 84  67  98 
1995 70  81  114 80  63 113 
1996 67  81  116 80  60 113 
1997 67  81  116 77  60 118 
1998  65 80  117 75  57 121 
1999  68 78  121 74  59 123 
2000  68 75  122 71  59 124 
2001  75 79  125 66  64 143 
2002  75 79  124 63  69 147 
 
Bold numbers mark the recovery period after the turnaround. 
Source: Lerman et al. (2004) based on official country statistics. 
   
Fig. 1. Gross Agricultural Output 1990-2002 
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Fig. 2. Agricultural Labor 1990-2002 

























   
Fig. 3. Agricultural Labor Productivity 1990-2002 




























Analysts in the CEE and CIS countries as well as outside observers have 
undertaken efforts to understand the sources of problems in the agriculture sectors, 
and to recommend policies to improve economic performance. These have ranged 
from simple ideas such as raising commodity prices to fundamental reforms of the 
legal and institutional arrangements governing property and contracting. In this 
context it is natural to consider new roles for cooperatives among the options. 
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Potential for Cooperatives 
 
The ideals of cooperative enterprise in agriculture have had a long history of 
acceptance and even enthusiastic advocacy in CEE and CIS countries. This legacy 
was tarnished by experience of State control of cooperatives. The International 
Labour Office recently summarized the situation as follows (Couture et al., 
2002:2):  
The State-controlled period was characterized by government interference 
in cooperative affairs at all levels. Most of the time, member registration 
was compulsory, and the directors and staff were not appointed by the 
members, but directly appointed by the State. In many countries, 
cooperatives were not particularly concerned about profitability since they 
were subsidized by the government and received preferential treatment. In 
the same way, they were subject to rigid State planning, which did not 
provide them with the possibility to develop their own entrepreneurial 
strategies. Their business affairs were often restricted to a small range of 
products and services, and State control extended to instructions and 
directives concerning, for example, the number of employees and their 
wages.  
The large collective farms that had these characteristics were administered under 
the label of cooperatives in the formerly socialist countries, even when they had 
not evolved out of voluntary associations but were imposed from above in a forced 
collectivization process. Consequently, among many of the rural population the 
concept of cooperation in agricultural production appears to have lost, if it ever 
had, the positive and idealistic connotations it has had in the traditional cooperative 
movement throughout Europe and North America. In its place, we find a strong 
psychological resistance to cooperation, bred from years of abuse of the whole 
concept by socialist regimes. As noted by the Plunkett Foundation (1995),  
The use of the word “co-operative” in Central and Eastern Europe will not 
only create the wrong impression, it will also create barriers to progress. 
The old style of co-operative or collective has no relevance in the new free-
market approach. 
The predominance of “old-style” production cooperatives in socialist agriculture as 
of 1970 is shown in Table 2 (the numbers do not include state farms).  
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Table 2. Share of Production Cooperatives in Socialist Agriculture 




USSR Bulgaria  Czecho-
slovakia 




37.5 68.0  55.7  67.6  1.2  53.9  72.0 
Number of 
employed 
64.2 58.7  60.5  75.5  0.9  82.0  72.2 
Productive 
assets 
42.4 56.7  47.9  --  1.4  23.6  -- 
Gross 
product 
40.0 62.6  53.2  45.8  1.1  42.3  -- 
State 
purchases:  
           
 grain  51.9 81.0  64.5  79.8  1.3  71.0  79.3 
 meat  33.3 44.7  50.0  --  1.3  20.6  -- 
 milk  36.5 59.7  53.4  43.3  0.6  28.7  -- 
 
Source: GSE 1973, vol. 13:102. 
 
 
The Soviet model of agriculture that emerged in the process of collectivization 
during the 1930s was automatically imposed by the USSR upon the CEE countries 
after World War II. Collectivization of agriculture in these countries was part of an 
extensive process of land reform, which included distribution of large estates to 
smallholders. Contrary to the Soviet Union, which eliminated all private land 
ownership immediately in October 1917, land in these countries was never 
completely nationalized, and production cooperatives were created on private land 
contributed by joining members. The original landownership records of 
cooperative members survived the Communist era in these countries. In all other 
respects, the production cooperatives in CEE were basically similar to Soviet 
collective farms: they were large-scale horizontally integrated multifunctional 
entities operating in a centrally controlled environment, which had a responsibility 
for both economic and social aspects of rural communities and whose members 
were largely treated as hired hands. The collectivized agriculture in CEE developed 
the same duality as Soviet agriculture, with large-scale production cooperatives 
coexisting symbiotically with small household plots of their members. 
Table 2 illustrates the very large share of Soviet-model collective farms in the 
agricultural sector of most countries in the region. The difference to 100% is Agricultural Cooperative Enterprise  7
largely made up by state farms, not the quasi-private household plot sector. A 
notable exception in CEE was Poland, where collectivization had not been forced 
and agriculture remained largely based on individual peasant farms (a similar 
system prevailed in Yugoslavia). Without large-scale multifunctional collectives, 
Poland retained a relatively receptive environment for agricultural service and 
credit cooperatives. In 1970, the Polish marketing cooperatives purchased over 
75% of farm products from peasant farms (GSE 1973, vol. 13:106). In general, 
throughout the rest of the region, various service and consumer cooperatives have 
not been eradicated as completely as in the USSR. In Hungary, 70% of consumer 
services were provided by cooperatives; in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, 
Poland, and East Germany, consumer cooperatives handled over 30% of all retail 
trade (1971 data) (GSE 1973, ibid.).  
While the end of State support created severe economic problems for 
agriculture in the transition economies, the end of State supervision created 
opportunities. Given the institutional inheritance of large collective farming 
operations, with management and on-site infrastructure for large-scale enterprise 
remaining largely intact, the idea was that autonomous cooperatives might solve 
some of these problems, especially in input provision and output marketing. The 
main competing idea, development of individually owned and operated farm 
enterprises along the predominant Western model, was hindered by the lack of 
property ownership in land, lack of competitive market sources of inputs, and lack 
of access to credit.  
Proponents of cooperatives as a means of progress in the agricultural sectors of 
transition economies, at a conference of the International Cooperative Alliance in 
1995, formulated the following principles of “genuine” cooperation (Couture et al., 
2002:2): 
•  democratic member control (generally ‘one-member, one vote’) 
•  voluntary and open membership 
•  member economic participation (on the basis of equity provided by 
members, with limitations on individually held equity) 
•  distribution of surpluses or profits as patronage refunds 
•  social consciousness (providing training and information, and community 
services). 
These principles are essentially congruent with U.S. statements of what 
distinguishes cooperatives from other forms of business, namely: “First, persons 
who own and finance the cooperative are those that use it. Second, control of the 
cooperative is by those who use it. Third, benefits of the cooperative are distributed 
to its users on the basis of their use.” (Barton, 1989:1).  Bruce GardnerAnd Zvi Lerman  8
Could the prospects for such cooperatives overcome the historically validated 
negative impressions of the past in the minds of agricultural producers or potential 
new farmers? If so, the new cooperatives would then have to overcome the 
classical economic problems that have been blamed for the failure of cooperatives 
in agricultural production in the West – problems of incentives of managers and 
workers (in allocation of on-farm effort, mobilization of members’ savings, 
distribution of the cooperative’s net returns, and means of treating off-farm income 
earned by members), of raising capital for investment , or of reaching collective 
decisions needed for example to adopt new technology or change the product mix 
to meet market trends. It seems likely that exposure to the negative side of Western 
debates on cooperatives would resonate with some whose experience with State-
directed collective farming was disheartening, even if for different reasons. 
 
 
Experiences with New Cooperatives 
 
Different countries in the region have pursued different farm restructuring 
strategies. Albania, Romania, Armenia, and to a certain extent also Georgia rapidly 
disbanded the collective farms and divided their land into very small private farms 
during 1991-92. In other countries, dismantling is a rare phenomenon and the 
traditional collective and state farms are generally required to reorganize into new 
corporate forms with market-sounding names, such as joint-stock company, limited 
liability partnership, etc. “Agricultural cooperative” is one of the corporate forms 
explicitly recognized by company laws in transition countries for the successors of 
former collectives. Agricultural cooperatives are observed quite frequently, as is 
evident from the data for Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova in Table 3. Yet 
agricultural cooperatives in transition countries are not really cooperatives in the 
Western sense of the word and they are virtually indistinguishable from other 
corporate farms. In a recent interview with the manager of a large agricultural 
cooperative in Hungary, it turned out that the farm was actually owned by the 
manager’s extended family and it was simply registered as a cooperative for legal 
and administrative considerations. The term “cooperative” thus appears to be a 
misnomer for farms in transition countries. This may explain why comparative 
productivity studies consistently fail to detect any performance differences between 
agricultural production cooperatives and other corporate farms in CIS and CEE 
(see, e.g., Curtiss et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2001). 
In most CIS countries land was generally privatized starting in 1991-92 
through a mechanism involving distribution of “land shares” – paper certificates of 
entitlement. These certificates could be converted on request into specific physical 
plots for individual farming, but most landowners simply turned around and Agricultural Cooperative Enterprise  9
entrusted their land shares to the managers of the former collectives for joint 
cultivation. Survey results consistently indicate that the new landowners 
overwhelmingly preferred the security of the cooperative umbrella to the risks and 
uncertainties of individual initiative 
 
Table 3. Number of agricultural production cooperatives in selected CIS 









percent of all 
corporate farms 
Russia (2001)  15,314  24,995  61% 
Ukraine (2000)  3,325  13,487  25% 
Moldova (2003)  166  1,527  11% 
 
Source: Official country statistics. 
 
(Lerman et al., 2004). These preferences are particularly strongly underscored by 
the landowner attitudes in Moldova and Ukraine, where land shares have been 
recently converted by law into fully titled and demarcated physical plots, so that 
special request is no longer required in order to obtain land. In Moldova, only one-
third of individual landowners cultivate their land independently, while fully two-
thirds entrust their land through various leasing arrangements to managers of newly 
created corporate farms, many of them registered as “agricultural cooperatives” 
(2000 World Bank survey). In Ukraine (2005 FAO survey), only 20% of rural 
landowners cultivate their own land, while two-thirds (as in Moldova) leave their 
land in joint cultivation in the local large enterprise (the remaining 13% lease their 
land to individual farmers). 
This attitude is also prevalent in the CEE countries, which unlike CIS have 
followed the strategy of restitution to former owners. Thus, half the restitution 
beneficiaries in Bulgaria and a significant proportion in Hungary have also chosen 
to remain in agricultural production cooperatives, while in Romania, where 
collectives were forcibly dismantled, fully 48% of land originally distributed to 
private farms is now in various informal farmers’ associations (Lerman et al., 
2004). Members of former collective farms are thus voting “with their feet” for 
perpetuation of the cooperative framework, at least in the immediate future, 
probably because of the sense of security it affords to individuals in a highly 
uncertain and rapidly changing environment.  Bruce GardnerAnd Zvi Lerman  10
Two conferences, one at which Western and Eastern European proponents of 
cooperation assessed the record as of 2001 and the other a more scholarly 
conference sponsored by the European Association of Agricultural Economists in 
2005, provided several informative case studies. Bulgaria is notable in that after the 
legislated liquidation of Soviet-style cooperatives and distribution of land holdings 
to individuals, at least on paper, in 1991, the way was clear, and encouraging, for 
the formation of new cooperatives. Most of the landowners chose “to unite their 
land and other resources in agricultural production cooperatives.” (Doitchinova et 
al., 2004:2). By 1998 the number of such “new” cooperatives reached 3,268, which 
with an average of 742 hectares and 234 members accounted for 42 percent of 
Bulgaria’s land in cultivation. However, the expansion occurred despite growing 
problems in maintaining viability in a difficult economic environment, caused 
partly by State credit that, in retrospect, was too easily granted. After a new Law 
for Cooperatives in 1999, which attempted to stem the budgetary costs of aid to 
cooperatives, the cooperatives accelerated moves already under way to devolve 
their assets to members, e.g., by renting land to non-members and their own 
members (“A strange thing is happening – the cooperators are renting land from 
themselves” (Ganev, 2001:36)). Many cooperatives were liquidated – essentially a 
declaration of bankruptcy – and the number remaining in operation dropped from 
about 3,300 in 1999 to 1,750 in 2003 (Doitchinova et al., 2004). 
Although it is still believed by some that “the fate of Bulgarian agriculture 
rests with the fate of agricultural cooperatives” (Ganev, 2001:35), the trend appears 
firmly in the direction of individual farms and larger agricultural holdings, 
essentially registered profit-seeking corporations, which grew to number 4,300 in 
2003, averaging 214 hectares in size and accounting for 30 percent of Bulgaria’s 
cultivated land (Doitchinova et al., 2004:6). Doitchinova et al. (2004) conclude 
with an assessment of what might be done to cure the problems of production 
cooperatives. The problems are seen as stemming from difficulties in resolving 
differences in interests of members, the distribution of income, mobilizing capital 
for investment, and ensuring labor participation of members, Several ideas for 
contractual arrangements among members are discussed, but the most promising 
alternative is seen as follows: “Most of the contradictions between the different 
groups of cooperative members can be solved by transforming the cooperative [to 
become] a limited liability company” (Doitchinova et al., 2004:8). This is not of 
course the end-state envisaged in the cooperative movement. 
The Czech Republic on the eve of transition in 1989 had an almost entirely 
collectivized agriculture, with 99 percent of both land and production attributed to 
large-scale collective and state farms. There were over 3,000 small, individually 
owned farms, but they accounted for less than 1 percent of the country’s land and 
production (Curtiss et al., 2004:4). The cooperative movement had had a strong Agricultural Cooperative Enterprise  11
presence in Czech agriculture for over 150 years (Moznar, 2001). The intellectual 
foundation was there for cooperatives to play a major role in picking up the pieces 
in the transition period of the 1990s. Indeed, the mandatory breakup of former 
collective farms resulted as of 2000 in a roughly even split of agricultural land 
between cooperatives of several kinds, business companies of several kinds, and 
owner-operated small farms (Moznar, 2001:44). The last category was expected by 
some to become predominant, and had expanded to an estimated 23 percent of 
Czech agricultural land by 1995; but from that point various larger-scale 
enterprises held their own (Curtiss et al., 2004:5).  
Hungary had some experience with cooperatives before 1948, but the Soviet-
style collective farm, where the residual profits were extracted by the State and the 
members were not independent owners, “was alien to the Hungarians, who had an 
entirely different tradition” (Sebestyen, 1993:301). The result was that the 
collective farm concept was transformed in the Hungarian context. Farmland was 
not nationalized and remained the property of the members (even if they could not 
farm all the land as individuals). As of 1990 there were 1,360 cooperative farms in 
operation, which accounted for 80 percent of all farmland. Of their one million 
members, half were active and half were pensioners (Filipsz and Szabo, 2001), and 
within these cooperatives there were about 40,000 relatively independent farming 
units, about 30 of them on average per cooperative. These were, for example, 
machinery-services units that rented equipment from the cooperative (Sebestyen, 
1993). 
Hungary’s history of flexibility of organization within a broadly Soviet-style 
collective farm system provided a useful starting point for the more drastic changes 
that had to be undertaken with the end of State support and direction after 1990. 
Laws governing compensation of former owners and reorganization of 
cooperatives were in place by 1992. The laws provided for the division of 
cooperatives’ assets among existing members (as well as former members and their 
heirs), permitted members to withdraw from the cooperative along with their share 
of assets, and specified that cooperatives may transform themselves into a limited 
liability or joint stock corporation. Enterprises that remained cooperatives were not 
entitled to special tax or credit treatment (Sebestyen, 1993).  
In these circumstances, the number of agricultural cooperatives in Hungary has 
declined substantially, to about 800 in 2000, which cultivated about a third of the 
country’s farmland and employed about 135,000 (compared to the 500,000 active 
members mentioned above for 1990). The cooperatives that disappeared often did 
so essentially through bankruptcy liquidation, with assets going either to former 
members or to corporate enterprises. As in the previously discussed countries, the 
cooperative as a means of organization of agricultural production is proving 
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Rizov and Mathijs (2003) attempt to explain the survival and growth of farms 
in Hungary using characteristics of the farms as explanatory variables, but they do 
not consider organizational form as a causal factor. Ferto and Fogarasi (2004) 
undertake an explanation of organizational form in Hungarian agriculture through 
application of ideas of transaction-cost economics as developed in Allen and Lueck 
(1998). The general hypothesis is that certain organizational forms, with a focus in 
these studies on family farms as compared to corporate farms, are best suited to 
particular economic environments. The particular hypotheses that receive most 
attention are that high transaction costs, for example in mobilizing capital or 
dealing in labor or product markets, favor large corporate farming in which more 
decisions are handled through internal management instructions rather than priced 
transactions (following Coase’s classic article, 1937); and that when price-based 
transactions are necessary, they are done at a scale sufficient to minimize high 
costs per transaction. Ferto and Fogarasi (2004) do not find empirical evidence that 
transaction-cost factors are important in explaining the prevalence or success of 
family farming as compared to larger-scale corporate farming, and they do not 
attempt to investigate whether the decline of cooperative farming might be linked 
to transaction-cost factors. Their work provokes the thought, however, that 
transaction costs should be considered in the analysis of fate of agricultural 
cooperatives, especially their devolution to much smaller individual farms. These 
small farms unquestionably face high transaction costs in both input acquisition 
and product marketing, and that could be a reason for cooperative enterprise to 
play a role in the farming economy even if not as the internal management 
mechanism for large farms.  
The study of Romanian organizational structure by Rizov (2002) suggests 
similar reasons for farmers becoming individual owner-operators, part-time 
farmers, or “association farmers” (essentially smaller-scale cooperative ventures 
for purposes of pooling capital). It is noteworthy that remaining a large-scale 
cooperative is not even considered a possibility in the Romanian context, given the 
“spontaneous privatization” with which many cooperatives were broken up by 
members upon their first opportunity to do so in 1991 (Rizov, 2002:172). 
 
 
Marketing and Input-Supply Cooperatives 
 
In considering cooperatives in agricultural production we have been looking where 
their prospects are in general weakest. In the United States, for example, all 
manner of experiments have been undertaken in cooperative and communal 
farming over the past 150 years, and they have almost without exception been 
commercial failures and have not survived; yet cooperatives in the broader Agricultural Cooperative Enterprise  13
agricultural economy have thrived. In 1915 marketing cooperatives sold $624 
million of farm products, amounting to 8 percent of U.S. farm output, In 2002 they 
sold $70 billion of products (including processed products), about 15 percent of the 
aggregate U.S. wholesale value of the products. Farm input and service 
cooperatives have grown to a volume of business of about $26 billion in 2002 
(USDA, 2004). Farm production cooperatives are too negligible to have any 
statistics reported on them. 
Many observers have noted that conditions in the transition economies that 
make farming economically most difficult involve marketing and even more so 
input supply. Often this is attributed to monopolies on either the buying or selling 
side, but it may equally well be a problem of high transaction costs in an 
environment of generally not well developed marketing infrastructure, including 
information, transportation, and storage services. Could cooperative enterprises 
owned by farmers remedy these problems? Certainly the hopes for this remain and 
are being implemented. In the case of Hungary, while farming cooperatives are not 
passing the survivor test, a substantial number of new cooperatives have been 
established in marketing and input supply. Legislation of 1999 provided financial 
support for the formation of such cooperatives and attempted to ensure access to 
working capital. As of 2000 there were estimated to be 500 new local cooperatives, 
including specialized ones for the marketing of fruits and vegetables, pigs, poultry, 
sheep, and for crop warehousing (Filipsz and Szabo, 2001). 
Legislation in transition countries is finally beginning to differentiate between 
production cooperatives and service cooperatives. This is a notable departure from 
earlier cooperative laws in the CIS, which distinguished between “consumer 
cooperatives” and “producer cooperatives”, indiscriminately lumping both 
production and service cooperatives in the latter category. Thus, the Ukrainian Law 
on Agricultural Cooperation adopted in July 1997, after a general definition of a 
cooperative as a voluntary association of members established for the pursuit of a 
common agricultural activity, specifies that production cooperatives (those created 
for joint farming activities) must be based on members’ labor and are therefore 
organized as associations of individual farmers, whereas service cooperatives 
(those created to provide farm support services to their members) may employ 
hired labor and their membership may therefore include both individual and 
corporate farms. The cooperative laws in Russia and Moldova, on the other hand, 
still restrict cooperative membership to individual farmers.  
No official statistics are available on service cooperatives in CEE and CIS, and 
we have to rely on farm-level surveys to provide some information on cooperation 
among farmers in transition countries. Despite the resistance to cooperatives 
stemming from the long-term abuse of this concept under the Soviet regime, we are 
witnessing the emergence of new forms of cooperation among individual farmers Bruce GardnerAnd Zvi Lerman  14
in transition countries (Table 4). This is voluntary cooperation, often informal and 
sporadic, that stands in stark contrast to the all-pervasive mandatory cooperation of 
the socialist era. Cooperation is quite strong in many areas, with the notable 
exception of processing and credit. Consistently with theoretical considerations, the 
level of cooperation is lower in Poland, where the market environment is 
substantially more developed than in the other countries. In another series of 
surveys conducted in CEE back in 1993 (Euroconsult, 1995), 45% of Romanian 
private farmers, 30% of Bulgarian farmers, and 15% of Hungarian farmers 
indicated that they participated in cooperative farm-support activities. 
 
Table 4. Cooperation in farm services among private farmers 
(percent of respondents) 
 
 Russia  Ukraine  Belarus  Armenia  Moldova  Poland 
Some form of 
cooperation 
74  82 60 44  30  20 
Consulting 58  64 33 9  10  8 
Marketing  33  24 13 10  11  8 
Input supply  30  20  7  1  7  5 
Machinery 43  45 37 19  19  7 
Production 
services 
27  34 17 10  11  6 
Processing  8  6 0 1  7  2 
Credit  37  16 10 0  2  2 
 
Source: World Bank surveys 1994-2000. 
 
Cooperation in machinery – a high-cost lumpy asset – is understandably one of the 
major areas of cooperation among individual farmers in transition countries. 
Through cooperation, the actual access of individual farmers to machinery and 
machinery services is much higher than that suggested by machinery ownership 
rates. Thus, in Armenia only 14% of farmers own farm machinery (either 
individually or jointly with their relatives and neighbors). Machinery pools and 
service cooperatives, however, ensure that fully 80% of individual farmers in this 
country have access to machinery or mechanical field services (Lerman and 
Mirzakhanian, 2001). In Moldova, fewer than 30% of peasant farmers participating 
in the 2000 World Bank survey have their own machinery; another 40% have 
access to machinery through joint ownership (a kind of low-level cooperation) or 
rental; finally, over 30% buy mechanical field services. It is not clear how much of 
the machinery rentals and custom machinery services originate from cooperatives Agricultural Cooperative Enterprise  15
and how much from private rental companies, but we have seen in Table 4 that 
about 20% of farmers have cooperation in machinery.  
New forms of cooperation compensate in part for the absence of crucial 
markets in products and services. As markets become more developed, the ways in 





Developments since the demise of socialist agriculture in the economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union provide a set of experiments in 
economic organization whose outcome will be crucial for the future of agriculture 
in those countries. For the agenda of this Journal, it is notable that a large element 
of these experiments involves the role and functioning of cooperatives. 
Two distinct roles of cooperatives are prominent in both on-the-ground means 
of replacing the former collective farm system and in legislation that attempts to 
facilitate the successor system. The first role is the cooperative as a means of 
business organization, one which follows the principles of farmer-members 
owning, controlling, and capturing the fruits of a relatively large-scale farming 
enterprise as a self-governing entity. The second role is the cooperative as a means 
of obtaining market power for farmers in relation to buyers of their products and 
providers of goods and services to the farm enterprise. 
While both of these roles have been alive and well in proposals and new laws 
in the transition economies, experience so far parallels the longstanding outcome in 
Western market economies: cooperatives have been overwhelmingly failures in the 
first role, but have been moderately successful in the second. The second role is 
important in farmers’ estimation when they see themselves as being exploited by 
monopoly or monopsony power among businesses that sell products to them or buy 
from them, and it is important in fact when perceptions of exploitation are accurate. 
It seems highly likely that such market failures exist in the economic environment 
of the transition economies, where former State monopolies have been transferred 
to private hands, and in this respect farmer-owned cooperatives can be useful in 
fostering competition, or in some cases hastening the creation of selling and buying 
channels which have not yet arisen in the transition.  
Cooperatives as a means of organizing multi-farmer agricultural production 
enterprises, despite some initial and continuing enthusiasm, have run afoul of the 
same weaknesses that underlie their general failure in the West: the seeming 
impossibility of implementing the basic principles. The central issues involve 
management decision-making and coordination. These tasks according to 
cooperative principles are essentially ones of self-government by equally Bruce GardnerAnd Zvi Lerman  16
empowered farmer-members, i.e., they are issues of politics. These arrangements 
can work successfully for homeowner associations, labor unions, and clubs of 
many kinds, so why not for farms? The difficulties pointed to in the Central and 
Eastern European cases are ones of getting agreement on many managerial 
decisions and on mobilization of capital for investment in the cooperative, but most 
of all on the division of revenues or profits among members whose contributions to 
the business vary. The difficulties lead to a tendency toward devolution of 
responsibilities, assets, and revenues toward individual members (leading to a 
loose association of independent farmers), or alternatively to managerial decision-
making by a hired executive or outside entity (converting the enterprise to a 
corporation or subsidiary of a non-agricultural enterprise). 
Even for cooperative enterprises in marketing and processing, or in supply of 
farm inputs and services, it is not clear how far the cooperative principles of 
management will prove viable. The Western story is moving toward cooperatives 
becoming managerially more and more like corporations, with ownership and 
management by persons other than the farmer-members. Indeed it is arguable that 
cooperatives still flourish more because of favorable tax and regulatory treatment 
than the advantages of cooperative principles as mechanisms of economic 
organization for the business. Can the story be different in the transition 
economies? 
The evidence on the fate of agricultural cooperatives in the CIS and CEE 
countries remains sketchy. The most useful findings at this time involve not 
conclusions, but questions for further investigation. One line of research that 
should prove fruitful is to analyze in more detail the experiences of individual 
farms. In a recent detailed study of Russian farm enterprises, we found a 
tremendous variation in the efficiency of production from farm to farm, not just by 
small margins but with large groups of farms getting 3 to 4 times the output from 
given resources as other farms (Grazhdaninova and Lerman, 2005) . This occurs 
not only between farms of different organizational forms, but even within the set of 
former collective farms within a given region. It is likely that different farms chose 
different ways of solving the managerial problems that arose following the demise 
of the collective-farm system. Among other differences, the extent to which 
cooperative principles were followed, and how they were implemented, are likely 
to vary among these farms. It could be illuminating to see the extent to which 
differences in the economic performance of these farms line up with differences in 
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